Who rules the digital?

Sovereignty and power in the platform age

Abstract

This article critically examines the impact of neossuseran hyperentities—transnational technology corporations wielding immense normative and regulatory power—on the foundations of classical constitutionalism. Starting from the hypothesis that state sovereignty, democratic consent, and checks and balances face functional collapse under digital technofeudalism, the study demonstrates that these entities operate as private sovereignties. They establish proprietary normative orders through opaque algorithms and data capture, directly affecting fundamental rights. Digital consent is treated as a fictional legitimization of an invisible subjugation regime, wherein the State loses centrality, becoming a guest within essential private infrastructures. The analysis draws on frameworks from Strange, Teubner, Zuboff, and Varoufakis and proposes a new constitutional grammar based on recognizing normative pluralism, algorithmic transparency, and the democratization of digital infrastructure. It concludes that constitutionalism's survival requires its reinvention to limit transnational technical powers and protect human dignity on a digital scale.